Prof. Avinatan Hassidim

Every year, hundreds of medical students in Israel must be matched to hospitals for their internships. Each student has their own preferences, while every hospital has a limited number of slots. If every candidate chose only their top priority, the result would be unbalanced: overcrowding in some locations, poor placement matches, and a compromise on fairness. Addressing this challenge requires a mechanism that accounts for everyone’s preferences simultaneously—aiming for an efficient, fair, and feasible assignment.

Prof. Avinatan Hassidim’s research focuses on exactly these challenges: designing algorithmic mechanisms that enable decision-making in complex scenarios. His work integrates algorithms, game theory, and computational economics, addressing questions of fair division, matching, auctions, and market design. The goal is to design mechanisms where participants can express their true preferences, from which an efficient and equitable solution is formulated. His work has been implemented in national matching systems, including medical internships, psychology residencies, and school admissions.

Primary Research Areas:

• Mechanism Design

• Algorithmic Game Theory

• Auctions and Market Design

• Fair Division (Cake Cutting)

• Approximation Algorithms

Research Nature:

 Theoretical-Applied, focusing on developing models and algorithms for matching, allocation, and decision-making, alongside large-scale real-world implementation.

Career Path:

Graduates of the group transition into diverse high-impact roles:

• Industry: Algorithm design, computational economics, and market design in major tech and Fintech companies.

• Academia: Researchers and faculty members specializing in game theory and computational economics.

• Public Sector: Designing matching and allocation mechanisms for governmental and public organizations.